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INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGE .EU on democratic despair and parliamentary deficit. Union towards Unity Sudden Wealth Curse Russian President Vladimir Putin, center, and the Netherland's Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende, left, enter a hall for a signing of documents ceremony in the Moscow Kremlin, Tuesday, Nov. 6, 2007, with Dutch gas company Nederlandse Gasunie NV President Marcel Kramer, right, in the background. Russian and Dutch officials signed an agreement Tuesday to include Dutch gas giant Nederlandse Gasunie NV in the Baltic Sea pipeline designed to bypass several European countries and ship Russian gas directly to Germany.
BIG DRIFT On emergent forces and drifting power. parl.europeanunity.eu Who checks What balances? Democratic despair. On growing complexity and the lack of overview. The source of the system, root cause of the process. The impossible dream: ideology of fiction. Totalitarian horror of the rule of business. The perversion of institutions. On supplementary parasites and parallel paradise. On official bullshit and and fuckin' lies. On North Atlantic Transparency. The European powerplan: gascartel.eu Input of error & impact of terror. On Unity, States & Crime. I&CTransparency and IT-error. Flagrant delicts & the money frame. Energy fundamentals of coal and steel. Land, Air, Water and Carbon forces. On the scale and scope of scandal, conduct & carbon crime. The White House disturbance of intellectual change. Democracy, an opinion; injustice and abusive authority factual evidence. European mobilisation against the american occupation. Why Europe is forced to think oildollars, not gas-euros. On the american contract with Europe: pipeline lock-ins. Inflating giants making place for emerging titans. The pre-Enron Complexxon of energy fundamentals. Supreme Crime of Supreme Courts. On promoting the notion of propriety. The Dutch treat of globalization. Collective amnesia, special interests and private aggression. The threat of faltering european institutions of government. Challenging the culture of fear and Rule of Business. On the terror of failing jurisdictions. On the notion of democracy and justice. Explaining democratic terror and parliamentary deficit. The Coca-Cola complex. Excess of address. The nuisance of abundance. Global grip on the grid of major crime. On peace and force. No Notion, No Justice. On the evidence and transparency of interacting forces. Public governance under market pressure. On coordinated competition. On management transition. The Public-Private Partnership doctrine / P3 virus. Amassing violation of Human Rights. The Silent War. On states hindering justice. The public notion of abusive authority. Make charity history by sharing fairly. On judicial negligence and suspect western jurisdictions.
In 1693 William Penn published his Essay on the Present and Future Peace of Europe. In this pamphlet Penn called for the establishment of a European Parliament. He argued that the voting system should be based on the demographic and economic importance of the various countries. Therefore Germany would have twelve votes whereas France, Spain, Russia and Turkey would have ten each, Italy eight and England six, an so on - a total of ninety votes in all. Penn suggested that decisions taken by the European Parliament should be enforced by a European Army. Little interest was shown in Penn's and it was not until the end of the 18th century that the subject was revived. In 1795 the German philosopher, Immanuel Kant, wrote Philosophical Project for Perpetual Peace. He suggested that to achieve this it was necessary to create a "federation of free states". Kant's views were supported by the English philosopher, Jeremy Bentham. In 1798 he wrote Principles of International Law where he argued that universal peace could only be obtained by first achieving European unity. He hoped that some form of European Parliament would be able to enforce the liberty of the press, free trade, the abandonment of all colonies and a reduction in the money being spent on armaments. In 1814 the French philosopher Claude-Henri Saint-Simon published On the Reorganisation of European Society (1814). In his book Saint-Simon argued that Europe was in "critical disequilibrium" and would soon undergo reconstruction. He argued strongly for a planned economy. He suggested a framework of three chambers: one body made up of engineers and artists to propose plans, a second of scientists responsible for assessing the plans, and a third group of industrialists whose task would be that of implementing the schemes according to the interests of the whole community. In 1851 an International Peace Congress was held in Paris. At the conference Victor Hugo called for the creation of a United States of Europe. "We say to France, to England, to Prussia, to Austria, to Spain, to Italy, to Russia, we say to them, 'A day will come when your weapons will fall from your hands, a day when war will seem absurd and be as impossible between Paris and London, St. Petersburg and Berlin, Vienna and Turin, as today it would seem impossible between Rouen and Amiens, Boston and Philadelphia." Pierre Joseph Proudhon was also a supporter of European Unity. In Principle of Federation (1863) he argued that nationalism inevitably leads to war. To reduce the power of nationalism Proudhon called for a Federal Europe. Proudhon believed that Federalism is "the supreme guarantee of all liberty and of all law, and must, without soldiers or priests, replace both feudal and Christian society." Proudhon went on to predict that "the twentieth century will open the era of federations, or humanity will begin again a purgatory of a thousand years." In 1900 there was a conference at the Institute of Paris on the subject of European Unity. At the conference the French lawyer, Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, argued: "It is no longer only the dreamers and philosophers, men in love with a perhaps superhuman ideal of peace and justice, who long to realize the old Utopian idea of a European union. It is also more positive minds, concerned above all about material interests or political advantages and preoccupied with the damage which its hates and internal divisions could bring to ancient Europe." After the First World War, the Italian industrialist, Giovanni Agnelli joined the campaign against the formation of the League of Nations. Instead he urged the establishment of "a federation of European states under a central power which governs them." He thought this would maintain peace in Europe. Agnetti also argued it would help economic growth: "Only a federal Europe will be able to give us a more economic realization of the division of labour, with the elimination of all customs barriers." Giovanni Agnelli eventually became disillusioned with this idea and became a supporter of Benito Mussolini. Figures on the far left also embraced the idea of a a united Europe. In his book, Perspectives of World Development (1924), Leon Trotsky urged the formation of a United Socialist States of Europe in order to resist the power of American capitalism. In 1926 Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi published his ideas for a united Europe in the Pan-Europa. The same year he established the Pan-European Union. People who joined included Albert Einstein, Thomas Mann, Sigmund Freud, Rainer Maria Rilke, Ortega y Gasset and Konrad Adenauer. The first leading politician to propose a united Europe was the French foreign minister, Aristide Briand. In 1929 he published a memorandum where he advocated the establishment of a European Federal Union. He gained support from Edouard Herriot but the idea stimulated little interest and was not taken up by other political leaders. In 1945 Jean Monnet was appointed as Planning Commissioner in France. In this post he became responsible for economic reconstruction. He began working on a scheme that he eventually proposed to Robert Schuman, the French Foreign Minister, in 1949. The Schuman Plan, as it became known, was the basis for the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) that was established in 1952. It was agreed that the six countries that signed the Treaty of Paris, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany, would pool its coal and steel resources. In 1958 the European Coal and Steel Community evolved into the European Economic Community (EEC). Under the ECC attempts were made to achieve harmonization. This included measures in areas such as indirect taxation, industrial regulation, agriculture, fisheries and monetary policies. The Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) was introduced in 1962. Britain made attempts to join the EEC in 1963 and 1967. This ended in failure, mainly due to the opposition of President Charles De Gaulle of France. Britain, under the leadership of Edward Heath, was finally admitted in 1973. Denmark and Ireland also joined at the same time. In 1975, the new British prime minister, Harold Wilson decided to hold a referendum on membership of the European Economic Community. Wilson allowed his Cabinet to support both the "Yes" and "No" campaigns and this led to a bitter split in the party. The Conservative Party was also divided over this issue but the British people eventually voted to remain in the EEC. In 1979 the EEC introduced the European Monetary System (EMS). The lost-term objective of the EMS was to achieve currency union and the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), a system of semi-fixed exchange rates. Greece joined the EEC in 1981. This was followed by Portugal (1986), Spain (1986) and the former East Germany (1990). In 1993 the organization was renamed the European Union (EU). Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the EU in 1995. In January 2002 the euro becomes the sole currency within the twelve participating Member States (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain).
(1) Victor Hugo, speech made at the International Peace Congress held in Paris in 1851. Gentlemen, if someone four centuries ago, at a time when war raged from parish to parish, from parish to parish, from town to town, from province - if someone had said to Lorraine, to Picardy, to Normandy, to Brittany, to Auvergne, to Province, to Dauphine, to Burgundy, 'A day will come when you will no longer wage war, when you will no longer raise men of arms against each other, when it will no longer raise men of arms against each other, when it will no longer be said that Normans have attacked the men of Picardy, and the men of Lorraine have driven back those of Burgundy; that you will still have differences to settle, interests to discuss, certainly disputes to solve, but do you know what you will have in place of men on foot and horseback, in place of guns, falconets, spears, pikes, and swords? You will have a small box made of wood, which you will call a ballot box. And do you know what this box will bring forth? An assembly, an assembly in which you will all feel you live, an assembly which will be like your own soul, a supreme and popular council which will decide, judge, and solve everything in law, which will cause the sword to fall from every hand and justice to rise in every heart. And this event will say to you, 'There ends your right, here begins your duty. Lay down your arms! Live in peace!" (2) Giovanni Agnelli, European Federation or League of Nations (1918) Without hesitation we believe that, if we really want to make war in Europe a phenomenon which cannot be repeated, there is only way to do so and we must be outspoken enough to consider it: a federation of European states under a central power which governs them. Any other milder version is but a delusion. The typical example which shows how one community, for its very survival, has had to change from a league of sovereign and independent states to a more complex form of a union of states ruled by a central power, is given with unsurpassable clarity by the history of the United States of America. As is well known, they went through two constitutions: the first, drawn up by a Congress of 13 states in 1776 and approved by these same states in February 1781; the second, approved by the national Convention of September 17th 1787 and which came into force in 1788. A comparison between the two documents explains why the first failed, threatening the independence and freedom itself of the young Union, while the second has created a Republic, which we now all admire. In Europe we had reached this level of absurdity, that every factory that arose in one state was a thorn in the side for every other state: that while the superb inventions of steam applied to land and sea transport, of electricity as motive power, of the telegraph and telephone had by then cancelled distance and made the world one single large centre and international market, little men strove with all their might to cancel the immense benefits of the big discoveries, artificially creating isolated markets and small production and consumption centres. . . Only a federal Europe will be able to give us a more economic realization of the division of labour, with the elimination of all customs barriers.
(3) Leon Trotsky, Perspectives of World Development (1924) The further this development unfolds along this road, all the more difficult will it be for the European Social Democracy to uphold the What is the Social Democracy using to benumb and poison the consciousness of the European workers? It tells them that we - the whole of Europe, dismembered and sliced-up by the Versailles Peace - cannot get along without America, but the European Communist Party will say: You lie, we could if we wanted to. Nothing compels us to remain in an atomised Europe. It is precisely the revolutionary proletariat that can unify Europe, by transforming it into the proletarian United States of Europe.
(4) Aristide Briand, speech (7th September, 1929) Among peoples who are geographically grouped together like the peoples of Europe there must exist a sort of federal link. It is this link which I wish to endeavour to establish. Evidently the association will act mainly in the economic sphere. That is the most pressing question. But I am sure also that from a political point of view, and from a social point of view the federal link, without infringing the sovereignty of any of the nations which might take part in such as association, could be beneficial.
(5) Aristide Briand, Memorandum on the Organisation of a Regime of European Federal Union (17th May, 1930) No one doubts today that the lack of cohesion in the grouping of the material and moral forces of Europe constitutes, practically, the most serious obstacle to the development and efficiency of all political and Juridical institutions on which it is the tendency to base the first attempts for a universal organisation of peace. The very action of the League of Nations, the responsibilities of which are the greater because it is universal might be exposed in Europe to serious obstacles if such breaking-up of territory were not offset, as soon as possible, by a bond of solidarity permitting European nations to at last become conscious of European geographical unity and to effect, within the framework of the League one of those regional understandings which the covenant formally recommended. This means that the search for a formula of European cooperation in connection with the League of Nations, far from weakening the authority of this latter must and can only tend to strengthen it, for it is closely connected with its aims. The European organisation contemplated could not oppose any ethnic group, on other continents or in Europe itself, outside of the League of Nations, any more than it could oppose the League of Nations. The policy of European union to which the search for a first bond of solidarity between European Governments ought to tend, implies in fact a conception absolutely contrary to that which may have determined formerly, in Europe, the formation of customs unions tending to abolish internal customs houses in order to erect on the boundaries of the community a more rigorous barrier against States situated outside of those unions.
(6) Konrad Adenauer, Memoirs 1945-53 (12th July, 1952) In 1929 the French statesman Aristide Briand had advocated a federal union of Europe, but unfortunately his proposals and arguments had found no political realization. They were taken up again after the Second World War, by General de Gaulle among others. But it was not until Winston Churchill made a speech on the United States of Europe at Zurich on 19 September 1946 that the world once more began to take a real interest in the question. This interest in creating a united Europe has never died down since then although the idea has still not found concrete political embodiment.
(7) Edouard Herriot, The United States of Europe (1930) (1) A European understanding can be achieved only within the framework of the League of Nations, as a part of the League, and marking a stage in its development. (2) Since the League Covenant permits regional agreements within a comment it follows 'a fortiori' that it cannot oppose the agreement of a whole continent. (3) A European understanding must take account both of international and of national alignments. (4) It must be open to all the nations of Europe which are willing to enter. (5) It is rendered necessary by the laws of economic evolution by industrial amalgamations, and by the necessity of defending the European market. (6) It must be sufficiently comprehensive to admit nations like Great Britain, which have both European and world-wide interests (7) The nations must be represented on absolutely equal terms. (8) It might very well seek inspiration from the form taken by the Pan-American Union, its method of procedure would be the holding of periodical conferences with a permanent secretariat. (9) It must be flexible, prudent and patient. (10) It must regard the suppression of tariff barriers as the end, not the beginning, of an economic organisation of Europe (11) It can achieve stability only by a European organisation of credit (12) Its durability will depend upon a fixed system of arbitration, disarmament, and security.
(8) Jean Monnet, memorandum to Robert Schuman and Georges Bidault (4th May, 1950) Wherever we look in the present world situation we see nothing but deadlock - whether it be the increasing acceptance of a war that is thought to be inevitable, the problem of Germany, the continuation of French recovery, the organisation of Europe, the very place of France in Europe and in the world. From such a situation there is only one way of escape: concrete action on a limited but decisive point, bringing about on this point a fundamental change and gradually modifying the very terms of all the problems. The continuation of France's recovery will be halted if the question of German industrial production and its competitive capacity is not rapidly solved. Already Germany is asking to increase her production from 11 to 14 million tons. We shall refuse, but the Americans will insist. Finally, we shall state our reservations but we shall give in. At the same time, French production is levelling off or even falling. Merely to state these facts makes it unnecessary to describe in great detail what the consequences will be: Germany expanding, German dumping on export markets; a call for the protection of French industries; the halting or camouflage of trade liberalisation; the reestablishment of prewar cartels; perhaps an orientation of German expansion towards the East, a prelude to political agreements; France fallen back into the rut of limited, protected production. The USA do not want things to take this course. They will accept an alternative solution if it is dynamic and constructive, especially if it is proposed by France. At the present moment, Europe can be brought to birth only by France. Only France can speak and act. But if France does not speak and act now, what will happen? A group will form around the United States, but in order to wage the Cold War with greater force. The obvious reason is that the countries of Europe are afraid and are seeking help. Britain will draw closer and closer to the United States; Germany will develop rapidly, and we shall not be able to prevent her being rearmed. France will be trapped again in her former Malthusianism, and this will lead inevitably to her being effaced.
(9) Robert Schuman, declaration (9th May, 1950) World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it. The contribution which an organised and living Europe can bring to civilisation is indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations. In taking upon herself for more than 20 years the role of champion of a united Europe, France has always had as her essential aim the service of peace. A united Europe was not achieved and we had war. Europe will not be made all at once or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity. The coming together of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of the age-old opposition of France and Germany. Any action which must be taken in the first place must concern these two countries. The pooling of coal and steel production should immediately provide for the setting up of common foundations for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe, and will change the destinies of those regions which have long been devoted to the manufacture of munitions of war, of which they have been the most constant victims. The solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible. The setting up of this powerful productive unit, open to all countries willing to take part and bound ultimately to provide all the member countries with the basic elements of industrial production
(10) Konrad Adenauer was interviewed by Joseph Kingsbury-Smith (21st March, 1950) A union such as I am suggesting is already coming into effect in the Benelux countries. The Scandinavian countries, as well as France and Italy, are contemplating similar measures. I therefore believe that these countries will welcome the union between France and Germany that I am proposing. They will surely be prepared to join such a union. If Great Britain really sees herself as a European power, she could occupy the place inside the framework of the United Nations of Europe that corresponds to her position and strength. The union I am proposing would also provide an incentive to the Marshall Plan. France and Germany would be the first countries to reach the goals envisaged by the fathers of the Marshall Plan and would smooth a path for the other participants. In this way the American people would see some real returns for the billions of dollars they have given to Europe, because there would be a genuine and significant contribution from within to the reconstruction and unification of Europe. The Council of Europe would likewise benefit from a union between France and Germany. The Council's effectiveness has been limited by the absence of a real understanding between France and Germany. It seems to me that no sensible person can fail to recognize that the union here proposed will give new strength and new life to the idea of European unification. I am firmly convinced that the union of the two nations will considerably raise the standard of living of both parts. The bigger an economic area is, the better it can be developed. The United States of America proves that. As I see it, this union could save the civilization of the West from decline. The cross-fertilization between France and Germany would undoubtedly give an extraordinary impetus to the cultural achievements of the two peoples. It would be another respect in which a Franco-German union would prove a signpost of our epoch.
(11) Konrad Adenauer, speech (12th July, 1952) It is my opinion and belief that the parliaments of the six European countries which will have to deal with this European Coal and Steel Community realise exactly what it is all about and that in particular they realise that the political goal, the political meaning of the European Coal and Steel Community, is infinitely larger than its economic purpose. Something further has resulted during the negotiations, I believe that for the first time in history, certainly in the history of the last centuries, countries want to renounce part of their sovereignty, voluntarily and without compulsion, in order to transfer the sovereignty to a supranational structure.
(12) Konrad Adenauer, speech (12th July, 1952) It is my opinion and belief that the parliaments of the six European countries which will have to deal with this European Coal and Steel Community realise exactly what it is all about and that in particular they realise that the political goal, the political meaning of the European Coal and Steel Community, is infinitely larger than its economic purpose. Something further has resulted during the negotiations, I believe that for the first time in history, certainly in the history of the last centuries, countries want to renounce part of their sovereignty, voluntarily and without compulsion, in order to transfer the sovereignty to a supranational structure.
(13) The Treaty of Paris (18th April, 1951) Article 1: By this Treaty, the High Contracting Parties establish among themselves a European Coal and Steel Community, founded upon a common market, common objectives and common institutions. Article 2: The European Coal and Steel Community shall have as its task to contribute, in harmony with the general economy of Member States and through the establishment of a common market as provided in Article 4, to economic expansion, growth of employment and a rising standard of living in the Member States. . . Article 4: The following are recognised as incompatible with the common market for coal and steel and shall accordingly be abolished and prohibited within the Community, as provided in this Treaty: (a) import and export duties, or charges having equivalent effect, and quantitative restrictions on the movement of products; (b) measures or practices which discriminate between producers, between purchasers or between consumers, especially in prices and delivery terms or transport or transport rates and conditions, and measures or practices which interfere with the purchaser's free choice of supplier; (c) subsidies or aids granted by States, or special charges imposed by States, in any form whatever; (d) restrictive practices which tend towards the sharing or exploiting of markets.
(14) Resolution adopted by the Foreign Ministers of the Member States of the European Coal and Steel Community at the Messina Conference (1st June 1955) The Governments of the Federal German Republic, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands believe that the time has come to make a fresh advance towards the building of Europe. They are of the opinion that this must be achieved, first of all, in the economic field. They consider that it is necessary to work for the establishment of a united Europe by the development of common institutions, the progressive fusion of national economies, the. creation of a common market and the progressive harmonisation of their social policies. Such a policy seems to them indispensable if Europe is to maintain her position in the world, regain her influence and prestige and achieve a continuing increase in the standard of living of her population.
(15) Konrad Adenauer, Memoirs 1945-1953 (1966) In my opinion the European nation states had a past but no future. This applied in the political and economic as well as in the social sphere. No single European country could guarantee a secure future to its people by its own strength. I regarded the Schuman Plan and the European Defence Community as preliminary steps to a political unification of Europe. In the EDO Treaty there was a specific provision for a controlling body, the so-called Parliamentary Assembly - incidentally the same assembly that exercised the parliamentary controlling function in the Coal and Steel Community - to examine the questions arising from the parallelism of diverse existing or future organisations for European cooperation, with a view to securing their coordination in the framework of a federal or confederate structure. The military aspect was only one dimension of a nascent Europe, or, more rightly at first, Western Europe. If a perfect partnership was to be achieved within Western Europe, one could not stop with defence. After twelve years of National Socialism there simply were no perfect solutions for Germany and certainly none for a divided Germany. There was very often only the policy of the lesser evil. We were a small and very exposed country. By our own strength we could achieve nothing. We must not be a no-man's-land between East and West for then we would have friends nowhere and a dangerous neighbour in the East. Any refusal by the Federal Republic to make common cause with Europe would have been German isolationism, a dangerous escape into inactivity. There was a cherished political illusion in the Federal Republic in those years: many people believed that America was in any case tied to Europe or even to the Elbe. American patience, however, had its limits. My motto was 'Help yourself and the United States will help you'. . . There were those in Germany who thought that for us the choice was either a policy for Europe or a policy for German unity. I considered this 'either/or' a fatal error. Nobody could explain how German unity in freedom was to be achieved without a strong and united Europe. When I say 'in freedom' I mean freedom before, during and above all after all- German elections. No policy is made with wishes alone and even less from weakness. Only when the West was strong might there be a genuine point of departure for peace negotiations to free not only the Soviet zone but all of enslaved Europe east of the iron curtain, and free it peacefully. To take the road that led into the European Community appeared to me the best service we could render the Germans in the Soviet zone.
(16) Treaty of Rome (25th March 1957) Article 1: By the present Treaty, the High Contracting Parties (Belgium, West Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and The Netherlands) establish among themselves a European Economic Community. Article 2: It shall be the aim of the Community, by establishing a Common Market and progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increased stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between its Member States. Article 3: For the purposes set out in the preceding Article, the activities of the Community shall include, under the conditions and with the timing provided for in this Treaty: (a) the elimination, as between Member States, of customs duties and of quantitative restrictions in regard to the importation and exportation of goods, as well as of all other measures with equivalent effect; (b) the establishment of a common customs tariff and a common commercial policy towards third countries; (c) the abolition, as between Member States, of the obstacles to the free movement of persons, services and capital; (d) the inauguration of a common agricultural policy; (e) the inauguration of a common transport policy; (f) the establishment of a system ensuring that competition shall not be distorted in the Common Market; (g) the application of procedures which shall make it possible to coordinate the economic policies of Member States and to remedy disequilibrium in their balances of payments; (h) the approximation of their respective municipal law to the extent necessary for the functioning of the Common Market; (i) the creation of a European Social Fund in order to improve the possibilities of employment for workers and to contribute to the raising of their standard of living; (j) the establishment of European Investment Bank intended to facilitate the economic expansion of the Community through the creation of new resources; and (k) the association of overseas countries and territories with the Community with a view to increasing trade and to pursuing jointly their effort towards economic and social development.
(17) Bela Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration (1962) Economic integration can take several forms that represent varying degrees of integration. These are a free-trade area, a customs union, a common market, an economic union, and complete economic integration. In a free trade area, tariffs (and quantitative restrictions) between the participating countries are abolished, but each country retains its own tariffs against non-members. Establishing a customs union involves, besides the suppression of discrimination in the field of commodity movements within the union, the equalisation of tariffs in trade with non-member countries. A higher form of economic integration is attained in a common market, where not only trade restrictions but also restrictions on factor movements are abolished. An economic union, as distinct from a common market, combines the suppression of restrictions on commodity and factor movements with some degree of harmonisation of national economic policies, in order to remove discrimination that was due to disparities in these policies. Finally, total economic integration presupposes the unification of monetary, fiscal, social, and countercyclical policies and requ |
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